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Abstract
Open communication over the Internet poses a serious threat to coun-
tries with repressive regimes, leading them to develop and deploy network-
based censorship mechanisms within their networks. Existing censorship
circumvention systems face different difficulties in providing unobservable
communication with their clients; this limits their availability and poses
threats to their users. To provide the required unobservability, several
recent circumvention systems suggest modifying Internet routers running
outside the censored region to intercept and redirect packets to censored
destinations. However, these approaches require modifications to ISP net-
works, and hence requires cooperation from ISP operators and/or network
equipment vendors, presenting a substantial deployment challenge.
In this paper we propose a deployable and unobservable censorship-
resistant infrastructure, called FreeWave. FreeWave works by modulat-
ing a client’s Internet connections into acoustic signals that are carried
over VoIP connections. Such VoIP connections are targeted to a server,
FreeWave server, that extracts the tunneled traffic of clients and proxies
them to the uncensored Internet. The use of actual VoIP connections, as
opposed to traffic morphing, allows FreeWave to relay its VoIP connec-
tions through oblivious VoIP nodes, hence keeping itself unblockable from
censors that perform IP address blocking. Also, the use of end-to-end en-
cryption prevents censors from identifying FreeWave’s VoIP connections
using packet content filtering technologies, like deep-packet inspection.
We prototype the designed FreeWave system over the popular VoIP
system of Skype. We show that FreeWave is able to reliably achieve com-
munication bandwidths that are sufficient for web browsing, even when
clients are far distanced from the FreeWave server.
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1 Introduction
The Internet is playing an ever increasing role in connecting people from across
the world, facilitating the free circulation of speech, ideas and information.
This poses a serious threat to the benefits and, even, the existence of repressive
regimes as it elevates their citizens’ awareness and provides them a powerful
media to arrange coordinated opposition movements. The recent unrest in
the Middle East indicates the very strong power of the Internet in arranging
nation-wide protests that, in several cases, has resulted in revolutionizing or
even overthrowing repressive regimes. To response to such threats, repressive
regimes make use of different technologies to restrict and monitor their citizens’
access to the Internet, known as Internet censorship. Censorship devices, called
censors, leverage techniques [11, 33] ranging from simple IP address blocking
and DNS hijacking, to the more complicated and resource-intensive deep packet
inspection (DPI) in order to enforce their restrictions and monitoring. Citizens
identified non-complying with such restrictions can face consequences ranging
from Internet service disruption to life-threatening punishments.
To help the censored users gain open access to the Internet different systems
and technologies have been designed and developed, generally referred to as
censorship circumvention tools. These systems are composed of computer and
networking technologies and allow Internet users to evade monitoring, blocking,
and tracing of their activities over the Internet. Early circumvention systems
work by proxying the Internet traffic of their users to censored Internet desti-
nations, foiling IP-address blocking and DNS hijacking performed by censors.
Examples of such systems are DynaWeb [1], Anonymizer [20], and Freenet [23].
The use of advanced content filtering technologies [11, 33], i.e., deep packet in-
spection, by censors renders the use of simple proxies ineffective for censorship
evasion. This resulted in the advent of more sophisticated circumvention sys-
tems like Ultrasurf [8] and Psiphon [4] that try to confuse content filtering tools
by obfuscating their design and/or traffic patterns. Such obfuscation does not
provide strong security promises for users, as investigated in recent study [16].
More recently, several circumvention systems are designed that work by hiding
the circumvented traffic in regular Internet traffic [21,27,30,48]. In addition to
special-purpose circumvention systems, anonymity systems are also often used
for censorship circumvention. Anonymity systems aim in hiding the browsing
activity of users from other parties, a objective in common with circumvention
systems. For instance, the Tor [26] anonymity system has recently adopted the
use of semi-public nodes, known as Tor bridges [25], that help censored users
to gain unrestricted access to the Internet anonymously. Through the rest of
this paper, by circumvention systems we consider both circumvention-centric
systems and the anonymity systems adopted to evade censorship.
While these circumvention systems have long been used by many users from
across the world they suffer from several important shortcomings. The biggest
threat to existing circumvention systems is their weak availability to users, i.e.,
they lack unblockability. Censors proactively look for services that help with
censorship circumvention and either disrupt their operation, or block their citi-
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zens from accessing them. In particular, censors rigorously look for IP addresses
belonging to circumvention technologies (e.g., HTTP/SOCKS proxies) and add
them to IP blacklists maintained by their censoring firewalls [3,11]. As a result,
citizens under repressive regimes commonly find it difficult to access operating
circumvention systems. For instance the popular Tor system has frequently
been/is blocked by censorship regimes [13, 46], making it unavailable to users
in certain countries. To improve their availability, circumvention systems have
taken different approaches to make their connections unobservable to censors,
hence unblockable. The Tor system, for instance, has deployed Tor bridges [25]
that are volunteer proxies whose IP addresses are distributed among Tor users
in a selective manner. This makes Tor bridges less prone to be identified by
censors, as compared to Tor entry nodes, however there are several challenges
in distributing their IP addresses among users [38, 39]. Other systems [21, 27]
try to provide unobservability (hence availability) by pre-sharing some secret
information with their users. This, however, is neither scalable, nor effective,
as it is challenging to share secrets with a large number of real users, while
keeping them secret from censors [28,35,44]. More recently, several systems are
proposed that rely on support from third-parties for their operation. For in-
stance Telex [48] and Cirripede [30] work by concealing the circumvented traffic
inside regular traffic thanks to some friendly ISPs that deflect/manipulate their
intercepted traffic. The real-world deployment of such circumvention systems
requires collaboration of several trusted ISPs that make software and/or hard-
ware modifications to their infrastructure; this does not seem to be realized in
short-time until there are enough financial motives for the ISPs.
In this paper, we design FreeWave, a censorship circumvention system that
is highly unblockable1. The main idea of FreeWave, as shown in Figure 1, is to
tunnel Internet traffic inside non-blocked VoIP communications by modulating
them into acoustic signals that are carried over VoIP connections. For a censored
user to use FreeWave for circumvention, she needs to setup a VoIP account
with a public VoIP provider, and also to install FreeWave’s client software on
her machine. Part of the FreeWave system is a FreeWave server that listens
on several publicly advertised VoIP IDs for connections from its clients. To
make a FreeWave connection, a user’s FreeWave client software makes VoIP
connections to FreeWave server’s VoIP IDs. The client and server, then, tunnel
the circumvented Internet traffic inside the established VoIP connections, by
modulating network packets into acoustic signals carried by the established VoIP
connections.
We claim that FreeWave provides strong unblockability promises since its
unblockability is tied to the availability of VoIP communications. VoIP con-
stitutes an important part of today’s Internet communications [6, 9, 10], hence
censors are not willing to block all VoIP communications due to several fi-
nancial and political reasons. A recent report [10] shows that about one-third
of U.S. businesses use VoIP solutions to reduce their telecommunications ex-
penses, and the report predicts the VoIP penetration to reach 79% by 2013, a
1We use terms unblockability and availability interchangeably.
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Figure 1: The main architecture of FreeWave.
50% increase compared to 2009. FreeWave’s availability is tied to the availabil-
ity of VoIP service: as the operation of FreeWave is not bound to a specific
VoIP provider, in order to block FreeWave a censor needs to block all VoIP
service providers. We also claim that a censor can not distinguish FreeWave-
related VoIP traffic from regular VoIP traffic: the modulation of circumvented
traffic inside real acoustic signals, as well as the use of encryption and coding
algorithms makes FreeWave’s VoIP connections unobservable to censors. In ad-
dition, the way FreeWave server is connected to the Internet results in getting
FreeWave’s VoIP connections to be relayed by various oblivious VoIP peers,
preventing a censor from blocking/identifying FreeWave’s VoIP connections by
matching IP addresses (see Figure 1). In fact, this is the key feature distin-
guishing FreeWave from similar circumvention systems that work by morphing
circumvented traffic to look like other protocols. For instance, SkypeMorph [40]
suggests to morph (i.e., shape) a Tor client’s traffic to a Tor bridge to look like
an encrypted Skype connection, in order to prevent a censor from identifying
the connection as a Tor connection and, hence, detecting the IP address of the
morphing Tor bridge. This, however, does not mitigate the big issue of dis-
tributing bridge IP address (and Skype IDs for SkypeMorph), so censors can
eventually identify IP addresses belonging to the morphing Tor bridges (e.g., by
pretending to be real clients), hence block the bridges and/or punish the identi-
fied clients. In FreeWave, however, the VoIP connections carrying circumvented
traffic are established between clients and some oblivious VoIP peers, so even a
censor’s knowledge of FreeWave server’s IP address can not help him in identi-
fying/blocking FreeWave’s VoIP connections (this is in contrast to SkypeMorph
where morphed VoIP connections are between clients and the Tor bridges).
We implement a prototype of FreeWave system over Skype and measure its
performance. Our evaluations show that FreeWave provides connection bit rates
that are convenient for regular web browsing. We also validate that FreeWave
can be used by clients that are geographically far away from the FreeWave
server, with a reasonably lower connection throughput.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows; in Section 2 we review related
research. In Section 3 we review our threat model and the goals in designing our
circumvention system. We describe the design of our proposed circumvention
system, FreeWave, in Section 4, and Section 5 discusses our design details.
In Section 6, we discuss the features of our designed circumvention system.
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Section 7 describes the FreeWave’s MoDem block, an essential component of
FreeWave that modulates Internet traffic into acoustic signals. We describe our
prototype implementation of FreeWave in Section 8, along with the evaluation
results. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 9.
2 Related work
Since the epoch of Internet censorship, different entities have designed and built
systems to combat censorship. This has resulted in an arms-race between cen-
sors and circumvention systems, a game with no ultimate winner as of now.
Early circumventions systems are based on setting up a proxy [24] server out-
side the censorship territories, trying to evade the simple IP address blocking
and DNS hijacking techniques enforced by pioneer censorship systems. Exam-
ples of such proxy-based circumvention tools are DynaWeb [1], Anonymizer [20],
and Freenet [23].
Proxy-based circumvention tools lost their capabilities with the advent of
more sophisticated censorship technologies, like deep-packet inspection [11, 33].
Deep-packet inspection analyzes packet contents looking for patterns indicating
the circumvention of the enforced censorship. This has pushed the circumven-
tion tools to correspondingly sophisticate their techniques in order to remain
available to users. In particular, several circumvention system base their avail-
ability on being unobservable from censors. Infranet [27], for example, works
by sharing some secret information with its clients, which are then used by the
clients to establish unobservable connections with Infranet servers. Collage [21]
is another system that, similarly, bases its unobservability on sharing secrets
with its clients. More specifically, a Collage client and the Collage server se-
cretly agree on some user-generated content sharing websites, e.g., flickr.com,
and use steganography to communicate through these websites. The main chal-
lenge for these systems is to share secret information with a large set of users
such that censors do not get hands on the shared secrets; this is a challeng-
ing problem to solve as discussed in several research [28, 35, 44]. Sharing secret
information with users has also been adopted by the popular Tor anonymity
network [26] to help with censorship circumvention. The secret information
here are the IP address of several volunteer nodes, Tor bridges [25], that proxy
the connections of Tor clients to the Tor network. This suffers from the same
limitation as censors can pretend to be real Tor users and gradually identify a
large fraction of Tor bridges [38, 39].
More recently, several research propose to build circumvention into the Inter-
net infrastructure [30,31,48]. Being built into the Internet infrastructure makes
such circumvention highly unobservable: a client’s covert communication with
a censored destination appears to the censor to be a benign traffic with a non-
prohibited destination. Telex [48], Cirripede [30] and Decoy Routing [31] are
example designs using such infrastructure-embedded approach. Decoy Routing
needs to share secrets with its clients using out-of-band channels, whereas Telex
and Cirripede share the secret information needed to initialize their connections
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using covert channels inside Internet traffic. Cirripede uses an additional client
registration stage that provides some advantages and limitations as compared
to Telex and Decoy routing systems. Even though these systems are a large
step forward in providing unobservable censorship circumvention their practical
deployment is not trivial as they need to be deployed by a number of real-world
ISPs that will make software/hardware modifications to their network infras-
tructures, something that needs enough financial motivations for ISPs to have
them deploy it.
Another research trend uses traffic obfuscation as a method to make cir-
cumvented traffic unobservable. Appelbaum et al. propose a platform that al-
lows one to build protocol-level obfuscation plugins for Tor, called pluggable
transports [17]. These plugins obfuscate a Tor client’s traffic to Tor bridges
by hiding it into another protocol that is allowed by censors. There are two
pluggable transports available; obfsproxy [36] obfuscates Tor traffic by passing
it through a stream cipher. Mohajeri et al. [40] show that obfsproxy generates
traffic patterns that are detectable by powerful censors. They, consequently,
propose SkypeMorph [40] that morphs a Tor client’s traffic into Skype video
calls, in order to make it undetectable by deep-packet inspection. We argue
that even though this prevents a censor from detecting Tor bridges through
traffic analysis, the censors can still pretend to be real Tor users and gradually
gain the IP addresses of Tor bridges, hence blocking their connections. The
authors of SkypeMorph propose frequent change of the detected IP addresses,
as well as the detected Skype IDs in response to this. As another possible issue,
in SkypeMorph clients need to send key initialization information to tor bridges
through Skype text messages. As such messages have a known format they can
be detected and blocked by Skype; in particular, since 2007 Skype provides a
special version of its client software to Chinese users that monitors and blocks
the text messages sent by Chinese users [12, 14, 15, 22]. CensorSpoofer [45] is
another recent research that aims in providing unobservable circumvention by
morphing circumvented traffic into spoofed VoIP connections. A common secu-
rity concern with morphing approaches is that they do not provide a provable
undistinguishability between a morphed traffic and the regular traffic; this may
result in finding effective statistical tests, in the future, that are able to detect
currently-undetectable morphing techniques, e.g., [40] mentions the possibility
of detecting Traffic Morphing [47] by analyzing inter-packet delays. As an-
other similar circumvention system, TranSteg [37] re-encodes the call stream in
a VoIP connection using a different codec in order to free a portion of VoIP
packet payloads, which are then used to send a low-bandwidth circumvented
traffic.
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3 Preliminaries
3.1 Threat model
We assume that a FreeWave user, namely FreeWave client, is connecting to the
Internet through a censoring ISP, i.e., an ISP that is controlled and regulated by
a censorship authority. Based on the regulations of the censoring ISP, its users
are not allowed to connect to certain Internet destinations, called the censored
destinations. The users are also prohibited from using censorship circumven-
tion technologies that would help them to evade the censoring regulations. The
censoring ISP uses a set of advanced technologies to enforce its censoring regula-
tions, including IP address blocking, DNS hijacking, and deep packet inspection.
The censoring ISP also monitors its users’ network traffic to identify and block
any usage of censorship circumvention tools; traffic analysis can be used by the
censor as a powerful technique for this purpose.
We assume that the censoring ISP enforces its regulations such that it
does not compromise the usability of the Internet, due to different political
and economical reasons. In other words, the enforced censorship does not dis-
able/disrupt key services of the Internet. In particular, we consider VoIP as a
key Internet service in today’s Internet [6,7,9], and we assume that, even though
a censor may block certain VoIP providers, it will not block all VoIP services.
VoIP constitutes a key part in the design of FreeWave.
3.2 System goals
We consider the following as the key features in designing and evaluating a
censorship circumvention system. Later in Section 6.1, we discuss these features
for the FreeWave circumvention system proposed in the consequent sections and
compare FreeWave with related work.
Unblockability: The main goal of a censorship circumvention system is to
help censored users gain access to censored Internet destinations. As a result, the
most trivial property of a circumvention system is being accessible by censored
users, i.e., it should not be unblockable by censors.
Unobservability: Unobservability is to hide users’ utilization of a circumven-
tion system from censorship authorities, which is a challenging feature to achieve
due to the recent advances in censorship technologies [11]. The importance of
unobservability is two-fold; first, an observable circumvention can jeopardize the
safety of a user who has been caught by the censor while using the circumven-
tion system; and, second, a weak unobservability commonly results in a weak
unblockability, as it allows censors to more easily identify, hence block, traffic
generated by the circumvention system.
Security: Several security considerations should be made once analyzing a
circumvention system. These considerations include users’ anonymity, security
and privacy from different entities including the censors, the utilized circumven-
tion system, and other third-parties.
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Deployment feasibility: An important feature of a circumvention system
is the amount of resources (e.g., hardware, network bandwidth, etc.) required
for it to be deployed in real-world. A circumvention system is also desired to
have few dependencies on other systems and entities in order to make it more
reliable, secure, and cost-effective.
Quality of service: A key feature in making a circumvention system popular
in practice is the quality of service provided by it in establishing circumvented
connections. Two important factors are the connection bandwidth, and the
browsing latency.
4 FreeWave scheme
In this section, we describe the design of FreeWave censorship circumvention.
Figure 1 shows the main architecture of FreeWave. In order to get connected
through FreeWave, a user installs a FreeWave client on her machine, which can
be obtained from an out-of-band channel, similar to other circumvention sys-
tems. The user sets up the installed FreeWave client by entering her own VoIP
ID and also the publicly known VoIP ID of FreeWave server. Once the FreeWave
client starts up, it makes a VoIP audio/video call to FreeWave server’s VoIP
ID. As discussed in Section 5.2, the FreeWave server is configured in a way that
VoIP connections initiated by clients are relayed through various oblivious VoIP
peers, e.g., Skype supernodes; this is a key security feature of FreeWave as it
prevents a censor from blocking FreeWave’s VoIP connections using IP address
blocking. Also, since FreeWave’s VoIP connections are end-to-end encrypted, a
censor will not be able to identify FreeWave’s VoIP connections by analyzing
traffic contents, e.g., by looking for the VoIP IDs. Using the established VoIP
connection, a FreeWave client circumvents censorship by modulating its user’s
Internet traffic into acoustic signals that are carried over by such VoIP connec-
tions. FreeWave server demodulates a client’s Internet traffic from the received
acoustic signals, and proxies the demodulated traffic to the requested Internet
destinations.
Next, we introduce the main components used in FreeWave and, then, de-
scribe how these components are used in the design of FreeWave’s client and
server.
4.1 Components of FreeWave
In this section, we introduce the main elements used in the design of Free-
Wave client and server software. The first three components are used by both
FreeWave client and FreeWave server, while the fourth element is only used by
FreeWave server.
VoIP client A Voice-over-IP (VoIP) client software that allows VoIP users to
connect to one (or more) specific VoIP service(s). In Section 5.2, we discuss the
choices of the VoIP service being used by FreeWave.
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Virtual sound card (VSC) A virtual sound card is a software application
that uses a physical sound card installed on a machine to generate one (or more)
isolated, virtual sound card interfaces on that machine. A virtual sound card
interface can be used by any application running on the host machine exactly the
same way a physical sound card is utilized. Also, the audio captured or played
by a virtual sound card does not interfere with that of other physical/virtual
sound interfaces installed on the same machine. We use virtual sound cards in
the design of FreeWave to isolate the audio signals generated by FreeWave from
the audio corresponding to other applications.
MoDem FreeWave client and server software use a modulator/demodular (Mo-
Dem) application that translates network traffic into acoustic signals and vice
versa. This allows FreeWave to tunnel the network traffic of its clients over VoIP
connections by modulating them into acoustic signals. We provide a detailed
description of the design of our MoDem in Section 7.
Proxy FreeWave server uses an ordinary proxy server application that prox-
ies the network traffic of FreeWave clients, received over VoIP connections, to
their final Internet destinations. Two popular choices for FreeWave’s proxy are
the HTTP proxy [41] and the SOCKS proxy [34] protocols; a SOCKS proxy
supports proxying of a wide range of IP protocols, while an HTTP proxy only
supports proxying of HTTP/HTTPS traffic, but it can perform HTTP-layer
optimizations like pre-fetching of web contents. Several proxy solutions support
both protocols.
4.2 Client design
The FreeWave client software, installed by a FreeWave user, is consisted of the
three main components listed above: a VoIP client application, a virtual sound
card (VSC), and the MoDem application. Figure 2 shows the block diagram
of the FreeWave client design. MoDem transforms the data of the network
connections sent by the web browser into acoustic signals and sends them over to
the VSC component. The FreeWave MoDem also listens on the VSC sound card
to receive specially formatted acoustic signals that carry modulated Internet
traffic; MoDem extracts the modulated Internet traffic from such acoustic signals
and sends them to the web browser. In fact, client’s web browser uses the
MoDem component as a web proxy, i.e., the listening port of MoDem is entered
in the HTTP/SOCKS proxy settings of the browser.
The VSC sound card acts as a bridge between MoDem and the VoIP client
component, i.e., it transfers audio signals between them. More specifically, the
VoIP client is set up to use the VSC sound card as its speaker and microphone
devices (VoIP applications allow a user to specify the (physical/virtual) sound
cards to be used with them). This provides MoDem and the VoIP client to
exchange audio signals that contain the modulated network traffic, isolated from
the audio generated/recorded by other applications on the client machine.
For the FreeWave client to connect to a particular FreeWave server it only
needs to know the VoIP ID belonging to that FreeWave server, but not the IP
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address of the FreeWave server. Every time the user starts up the FreeWave
client application on her machine the VoIP application of FreeWave client ini-
tiates an audio/video VoIP call to the known VoIP ID of the FreeWave server.
4.3 Server design
Figure 3 shows the design of FreeWave server, which consists of four main el-
ements. FreeWave server uses a VoIP client application to connect with its
clients through VoIP connections. FreeWave server chooses one or more VoIP
IDs, which are provided to its clients, e.g., through public advertisement.
The VOIP client of FreeWave server uses one (or more) virtual sound cards
(VSC) as its speaker and microphone devices. The number of VSCs used by
the server depends on the deployment scenario, as discussed in Section 5.1. The
VSC(s) are also being used by a MoDem component, that transforms acoustic
signals into network traffic and vice versa. More specifically, MoDem extracts
the Internet traffic modulated by FreeWave clients into audio signals from VoIP
connections and forwards them to the last element of the FreeWave server,
FreeWave proxy. The MoDem also modulates Internet traffic received from the
proxy component into acoustic signals and sends them to the VoIP client soft-
ware through the VSC interface. The FreeWave proxy is a regular network
proxy, e.g., an HTTP proxy, that is used by FreeWave server to connect Free-
Wave clients to the Internet in an unrestricted manner. As mentioned above in
Section 4.2, the web browser of a FreeWave client targets its traffic to a net-
work proxy; such proxied traffic is received by FreeWave server’s proxy server
(through the VoIP connections, as described) and is processed as required.
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5 Other design details
5.1 Deployment scenarios
The FreeWave system proposed in this paper can be deployed by ”good” entities
that run FreeWave servers to help censored users gain an uncensored access to
the Internet. We consider the following scenarios for a real-world deployment
of FreeWave. In Section 6.2, we discuss the security considerations for each of
these scenarios.
• Personal deployment: A person having an uncensored access to the Inter-
net can set up a personal FreeWave server on her personal machine, trying
to anonymously help censored users evade censorship. Such a person can,
then, advertise her VoIP ID (associated with her FreeWave server) pub-
licly (e.g., through social networks) and anyone learning this ID would be
able to connect to the Internet by running a FreeWave client software. To
save her bandwidth, such a person can configure its FreeWave server to
enforce restrictions on the quality of service provided to clients.
• Central VoIP-center: FreeWave service can be deployed and maintained
by a central authority, e.g., a for-profit or non-profit organization. The
deploying organization can build and run FreeWave servers that are a
able to serve a large number of FreeWave clients. To be able to support
large numbers of clients, the used FreeWave servers should deploy several
physical/virtual sound cards. Also, by generating VoIP IDs on several,
different VoIP service providers such central FreeWave system will be able
to service FreeWave clients with different VoIP preferences. Such a cen-
tral deployment of FreeWave can operate for commercial profit, e.g., by
charging clients for using the system, or can be established as a non-profit
systems, e.g., being funded by NGOs or pro-freedom governments.
• Central phone-center: As an alternative approach, FreeWave can be de-
ployed using an automated telephone center. More specifically, instead
of VoIP IDs, the FreeWave server will publicize several phone numbers,
which are used by clients to connect to the FreeWave server. FreeWave
users need to use the exact same FreeWave client software, except that in-
stead of making VoIP calls to FreeWave server’s VoIP IDs they will make
VoIP calls to FreeWave server’s phone numbers. Compared to the ”central
VoIP-center” approach, this has the big advantage that clients can arbi-
trarily choose any VoIP service provider for the client software, while in
the ”central service” design users need to choose from the VoIP systems
supported by FreeWave server (though a powerful FreeWave server can
support many VoIP systems).
• Distributed service: FreeWave service can also be deployed in a distributed
architecture, similar to that of the popular anonymity network of Tor [26].
More specifically, FreeWave server can be consisted of a number of vol-
unteer computers that run instances of FreeWave server software on their
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machines. A central authority can manage the addition of new volunteer
nodes to the system and also the advertisement (or distribution) of their
VoIP IDs to the clients.
5.2 The choice of VoIP system
There are numerous freeware and paid VoIP service providers that can be uti-
lized by the FreeWave system, e.g., Skype2, Vonage3, iCal4, etc. Each VoIP
service provider provides an application software for its clients; also, there are
software that support connection to different VoIP providers, e.g., PhonerLite5.
In this section, we mention possible VoIP service provider candidates to be used
by FreeWave.
5.2.1 Skype
Skype is a peer-to-peer VoIP system that provides voice calls, instant messaging,
and video calls to its clients over the Internet. Skype is one of the most popular
VoIP service providers with over 663 million users6 as of September 2011.
Skype uses an undisclosed proprietary design, which has been analyzed in
several research [18, 29, 49]. These studies find that Skype uses a peer-to-peer
overlay network with the Skype users as its nodes. There are two types of
nodes on Skype: ordinary nodes, and super nodes (SN). Any Skype client with
a public IP address, having sufficient CPU, memory, and network bandwidth
is considered a super nodes, and all the other nodes are considered as ordinary
nodes. In addition, Skype uses a central login server that keeps users’ login
credentials and is used by Skype users to register into Skype’s overlay network.
Apart from the login server all Skype communications work in a peer-to-peer
manner, including the user search queries and online/offline user information.
A key feature that makes Skype an ideal choice for FreeWave is its peer-to-
peer network. In particular, a VoIP connection made towards an ordinary node
in Skype gets relayed by at least one oblivious Skype super node [18,29]. More
specifically, each ordinary node maintains a host cache (HC) table that keeps
a list of reachable super nodes, which are used by the ordinary node to make
Skype connections. We use this feature to protect FreeWave from being blocked
by censors: by having our FreeWave server to act as an ordinary node the VoIP
connections from FreeWave clients to the FreeWave server will be relayed by
alternative super nodes, hence censors will not be able to enforce IP address
blocking. We discuss this further in Section 6.2. Note that a FreeWave server
can have its VoIP connections be relayed by arbitrarily various super nodes by
frequently flushing its HC table [18].
Based on the criteria mentioned for a super node, an easy way to be consid-
ered an ordinary node by Skype is to sit behind NAT or a firewall [29] (since a
2http://www.skype.com
3http://www.vonage.com
4http://www.icall.com/
5http://www.phonerlite.de/index_en.htm
6http://www.telecompaper.com/news/skype-grows-fy-revenues-20-reaches-663-mln-users
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super node must have a static public IP address). As a result, in order to have
a FreeWave server to be considered as a Skype ordinary node, it can simply
be protected by a firewall or can be put behind a NAT with dynamic address
allocations. As another interesting feature for FreeWave, all Skype connections
are secured by end-to-end encryption [18, 29].
5.2.2 SIP-based VoIP
Session initiation protocol [42] (SIP) is a light-wight, popular signaling protocol
and is widely used by VoIP providers, e.g., SFLphone7, Zfone8, and Blink9,
to establish calls between clients. A SIP-based VoIP system consists of three
main elements [42]: 1) user agents that try to establish SIP connections on
behalf of users, 2) a location service that is a database keeping information
about the users, and 3) a number of servers that help users in establishing SIP
connections. In particular, there are two types of SIP servers; registrar servers
receive registration requests sent by user agents and update the location service
database. The second type of SIP servers are the proxy servers that receive SIP
requests from user agents and other SIP proxies and help in establishing the
SIP connections.
Once a SIP connection is established between two user agents a media de-
livery protocol is used to transfer the media among the users. In particular,
most of the SIP-based VoIP systems use the Real-time Transport Protocol [43]
(RTP) to exchange audio data, and use the Real-Time Transport Control Pro-
tocol [43] (RTCP) protocol to control the established RTP connections. User
agents in SIP-based VoIP system are allowed to use an encryption-enabled ver-
sion of RTP, called Secure Real-time Transport Protocol [19] (SRTP), in order
to secure their VoIP calls. Note that the encryption supported by SRTP is done
end-to-end and the VoIP servers are not required to support encryption. We
mandate the SIP-based design of FreeWave to use SRTP for media transfer.
Similar to the case of Skype, if a user agent is behind a NAT or a firewall it
will use an intermediate node to establish its VoIP connections. In particular,
two popular techniques used by VoIP service providers to bypass NAT and
firewalls are session border controller (SBC) [5] and RTP bridge servers [2]. As
in the case of the Skype-based FreeWave, putting a FreeWave server behind a
firewall masks its IP address from censors, as the VoIP calls to it will be relayed
through oblivious intermediate nodes.
6 Discussions
6.1 Evalution of the design goals
In Section 3.2, we listed several features that we consider in designing an effec-
tive circumvention system. Here, we discuss the extent to which our proposed
7http://sflphone.org/
8http://zfoneproject.com/
9http://icanblink.com/
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system, FreeWave, achieves such requirements.
Unblockability: In order to use FreeWave, a client only needs to know the
VoIP ID of the FreeWave server, i.e., server-id, but no other secret/public
information like the server’s IP address. server-id is distributed in a public
manner to the users, so we assume that it is also known to censors. Considering
the use of encrypted VoIP connections by FreeWave, this public knowledge of
server-id does not allow censors to identify (and block) the VoIP connections
to FreeWave server. In addition, a censor will not be able to identify FreeWave’s
VoIP connections from their IP addresses since, as discussed in Section 5.2,
the encrypted VoIP connections to the FreeWave server are relayed through
oblivious, intermediate nodes. For instance, in Skype-based FreeWave the VoIP
connections to the FreeWave server are relayed by oblivious Skype super nodes.
Also, FreeWave server is not mapped to a particular set of super nodes, i.e.,
its VoIP connections are relayed through a varying set of super nodes. Another
point in making FreeWave unblockable is that it does not depend on a particular
VoIP system, and can use any VoIP provider for its connections. As a result,
in order to block FreeWave, censors will need to block all VoIP services, which
is very unlikely due to several political and economical considerations.
Note that unblockability is a serious challenge with many existing circum-
vention systems, as the information advertised for their utilization can be used
by censors to block them. For example, the Tor [26] system requires its clients to
connect to a public set of its IP addresses, which can be IP-filtered by censors.
More recently, Tor has adopted the use of Tor bridges [25], which are volunteer
proxies with semi-public IP addresses. Unfortunately, there are different chal-
lenges [38, 39, 44] in distributing the IP addresses of Tor bridges only to real
clients, but not to the censors.
Unobservability: The arguments made above for FreeWave’s unblockability
can also be used to justify its unobservability. As mentioned above, even though
FreeWave server’s VoIP ID (server-id) is assumed to be known to censors, the
end-to-end encryption of VoIP connections prevents a censor from observing
users making VoIP connections to server-id. In addition, VoIP relays sit-
ting between FreeWave clients and a FreeWave server, e.g., Skype super nodes,
prevent identification of FreeWave connections by matching IP addresses.
Security: We devote Section 6.2 to discussing the security of FreeWave.
Deployment feasibility: The real-world deployment of FreeWave does not
rely on other entities. This is in contrast to some recent designs that need collab-
oration from third parties for their operation. For instance, Infranet [27] requires
support from some web destinations that host the circumvention servers. As
another example, several recent systems [30, 31, 48] rely on collaboration from
friendly ISPs for their operation.
Quality of service: In Section 8, we discus the connection performance
provided by our prototype implementation of FreeWave. Our results show that
FreeWave provides reliable connections that are good for normal web browsing.
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6.2 Security analysis
In this section, we discuss the security of FreeWave clients to threats imposed
by different entities.
6.2.1 Security from censors
The end-to-end encryption of VoIP connections protects the confidentiality of
the data being sent by FreeWave clients from a monitoring censor, even if the
censor is able to identify VoIP connections targeted to FreeWave. Such end-to-
end encryption also ensures the web browsing privacy of FreeWave clients. As
mentioned in Section 5.2, Skype calls are encrypted end-to-end, and, SIP-based
VoIPs also provide end-to-end encryption using the SRTP protocol.
Even though FreeWave uses encrypted VoIP connections a censor may still
try to identify FreeWave-generated VoIP connections by performing traffic anal-
ysis, i.e., by analyzing communication patterns. Since FreeWave makes real
VoIP connections, traffic patterns of FreeWave’s VoIP connections will be in-
distinguishable from those of typical VoIP traffic. In order to better disguise
traffic patterns, a FreeWave client can make video calls, instead of voice-only
calls, and use the audio channel of the video calls for tunneling FreeWave traf-
fic. This can better hide the traffic pattern of FreeWave VoIP connections, as
discussed in [40].
6.2.2 Security from FreeWave servers
A FreeWave server only knows the VoIP IDs of its client, but not their IP
addresses since the VoIP connections are being relayed through intermediate
VoIP nodes, as described before. As a result, unless the VoIP service is colluding
with a FreeWave server, the FreeWave server will not be able to link VoIP IDs
to IP addresses.
In the basic design of FreeWave mentioned above a FreeWave server can ob-
serve the traffic contents the browsing activity corresponding to a client VoIP ID,
since the tunneled traffic is not always encrypted. However, a client can easily
ensure security and privacy from the server by using an extra layer of encryp-
tion. For instance, a client can use FreeWave to get connected to an anonymity
system like Anonymizer [20], and then use the tunnelled connection with this
anonymity system to browse the Internet. This secures this client’s traffic from
the FreeWave server, as well as makes it confidential. Note that considering the
fact that FreeWave clients are always anonymized from FreeWave servers, clients
may opt not to use such an additional protection for low-sensitivity activities
like web browsing.
6.2.3 Security from VoIP providers
The VoIP connections between FreeWave clients and servers are encrypted end-
to-end; as a result, the VoIP provider will not be able to observe neither the
data being communicated, nor the web destinations being browsed through such
15
Figure 4: Frame structure
connections. However, the VoIP service provider is able to identify VoIP IDs
that have made VoIP calls to FreeWave server. As a result, in order to ensure
its unobservability FreeWave needs to use VoIP providers that are not colluding
with censors. Note that FreeWave does not rely on a particular VoIP system
and any VoIP provider can be used for its operation.
7 FreeWave MoDem
The MoDem component is an essential component of both FreeWave client and
FreeWave server, which translates Internet traffic into acoustic signals and vice
versa. MoDem consists of a transmitter and a receiver. MoDem’s transmitter
modulates data (IP bits) into acoustic signals, and MoDem’s receiver demod-
ulates data from a received acoustic signal. In the following, we describe the
design of MoDem’s transmitter and receiver.
7.1 Transmitter description
The transmitter structure considered here is based on bit-interleaved coded
modulation (BICM). First, the information bits {ai} are encoded by a rate Rc
channel encoder, producing the coded bit sequence {bi}. The sequence {bi} is
permuted using a random interleaver and the resulting sequence is then parti-
tioned into length Q subsequences cn = [c
1
n, . . . , c
Q
n }. Each such subsequence is
finally mapped to a 2Q-ary quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) symbol.
Data transmission is carried out frame-by-frame. As shown in Figure 4, a
frame consists of T sets of the training symbols followed by the data symbols. A
block of known preamble symbols as well as a block of signal symbols are inserted
in front of every frame. The preamble symbols are needed for synchronization
and receiver initialization purposes. The signal symbols tell the receiver what
modulation and coding was used for the data symbols. The training symbols
are needed to adapt the equalizer to the time-varying channel. We enumerate
the symbols in this frame by xn.
The symbol sequence xn is mapped to a waveform x(t) : R → C
x(t) =
∑
l
xlp(t− lT ) (1)
by use of a basic pulse p(t) time shifted by multiples of the symbol period T .
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Figure 5: Block diagram of the receiver architecture. Π and Π−1 denote inter-
leaving and deinterleaving operations, respectively.
This signal is then modulated to passband
xPB(t) = 2ℜ{x(t)e
2piifC t} (2)
at carrier frequency fC and sent over the Skype channel.
7.2 Receiver description
We assume the passband channel effect to be linear. An equivalent baseband
channel representation is obtained by demodulating and low-pass filtering the
received signal r(t). After synchronization and symbol-spaced sampling, we
obtain the equivalent discrete baseband channel observations rn.
rn =
Kp∑
k=−Kf
hn,kxn−k + wn (3)
where n and k are time and delay indices, respectively and wn is a complex
white Gaussian noise process. The channel length is assumed to be at most
Kf + Kp + 1, where Kf is the length of the precursor and Kp is that of the
postcursor response. We explicitly allow for the channel the gains hn,k to change
in time n.
A block diagram of the used Turbo Equalizer system is shown in Figure 5.
The equalizer produces extrinsic log-likelihood ratios (LLRs) on the coded bits
using the received vector yn and the a priori LLRs on them [32]. Specifically, the
extrinsic LLR Lext(c
q
n) can be obtained from Lext(c
q
n) = Lpost(c
q
n) − Lpri(c
q
n),
where Lpri(c
q
n) is the a priori LLR defined as Lpri(c
q
n) = lnPr(c
q
n = 1) −
lnPr(cqn = 0) and Lpost(c
q
n) is the a posteriori LLR defined as Lpost(c
q
n) =
lnPr(cqn = 1|observation) − lnPr(c
q
n = 0|observation). Note that the observa-
tion can be any function of yn and the a priori LLRs are obtained from the
channel decoder. The extrinsic LLRs produced in the equalizer are delivered to
the channel decoder through the deinterleaver. They are used as a priori LLRs
to produce the additional extrinsic LLRs in the channel decoder. Finally, the
extrinsic LLRs obtained by the channel decoder are fed back to the equalizer
to aid the equalization task. These steps complete one cycle of turbo iteration
and are repeated until a suitably chosen convergence criterion is achieved.
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8 Implementation and results
We build a prototype implementation of FreeWave over Skype. We use MAT-
LAB7 to build our MoDem component, and we use Virtual Audio Card 10 as
our virtual sound card (VSC) software. We also use the Skype client software
provided by Skype Inc. as our VoIP client component. Our MoDem software,
as well as the Skype client are set up to use the Virtual Audio Card as their
audio interface. We build FreeWave client and a FreeWave server, using the
components mentioned above. In order to emulate a real-world experience, i.e.,
a long distance between FreeWave client and FreeWave server, we connect our
FreeWave client to the Internet though a VPN connection. In particular we
use the SecurityKISS VPN solution that allows us to pick VPN servers located
in different geographical locations around the world. In particular, in our ex-
periments we use VPN servers that are located in Poland and USA. Note that
this identifies the location of our FreeWave client, and our FreeWave server is
located within USA (near Indianapolis).
MoDem Specifications: Our evaluations show that the data rates that
can be achieved with our system clearly depend on the quality of the Skype
connection. The minimum bandwidth required for a voice call is 30 kbps for
both upload and download speed, according to Skype. The pulse function of p(t)
is a square-root raised cosine filter with a roll-off factor 0.2 and a bandwidth of
1/T . The carrier frequency fC is chosen such that the spectrum of the voiceband
is always covered. At the receiver the same square-root raised cosine filter is
used for low-pass filtering. Our communication system automatically adjusts
the symbol constellation size Q, the channel coding rate Rc and the symbol
period T such that the best possible data rate is achieved. The receiver knows
how well the training symbols were received and based on this feedback the
transmitter can optimize the data rate. The relationship between the data rate
R and the above parameters is
R =
QRc
T
. (4)
The receiver used in our setup is iterative. The number of iterations needed for
convergence depend on the channel condition. The channel condition is typically
measured by means of signal to noise power ratio, the SNR. Figure 6 shows the
bit error rate (BER) performance of our receiver for given SNR. The plot also
compares two different channel codes. A turbo code (precoded) and a regular
convolutional code (not precoded).
Our results are summarized in table 1. The table lists the best compromise
between the data rates and the packet drop rate, for various destinations. As can
be seen, for our FreeWave server being located in midwest (near Indianapolis) a
FreeWave client can get a reliable connection with a bit rate of 19.2 kbps , while
a user in Poland achieves a connection bit rate of 16 kbps. These bit rates are
convenient for regular web browsing, which is the main intent of censored users.
10http://software.muzychenko.net/eng/vac.htm
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Figure 6: BER versus SNR for FreeWave.
Data rate (R) Q 1/T RC Packet drop rate Location of client
16000 bps 4 8000 kHz 0.5 0.06 Lodz, Poland
19200 bps 4 9600 kHz 0.5 0.01 Chicago, IL
Table 1: Evaluation results of FreeWave.
Also, note that while FreeWave provides a fairly low bit-rate, as compared to
other circumvention systems, its connections is highly unblockable, as discussed
throughout this paper.
9 Coclusions
In this paper, we presented FreeWave, a censorship circumvention system that
is highly unblockable by censors. FreeWave works by modulating a client’s
Internet traffic inside the acoustic signals that are carried over VoIP connections.
Being modulated into acoustic signals, as well as the use of encryption makes
FreeWave’s VoIP connections unobservable by a censor. By building a prototype
implementation of FreeWave we show that FreeWave can be used to achieve
connection bit rates that are suitable for normal web browsing.
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